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INTRODUCTION 
In his classic 1967 book, Privacy and Freedom, Professor Alan 
Westin explained that humans desire neither complete isolation, nor 
complete exposure, as each would be a form of torture.1 In order to 
live and thrive, human beings require a condition that lies somewhere 
between the two poles.2 Each individual strikes this balance in his or 
her own way. Some wish to share more about themselves, and some 
less. Westin accordingly defined the right to privacy as the right to 
control one’s personal information.3 Modern privacy law is largely 
based on this foundational definition. It employs notice, choice, and 
purpose limitations to give individuals control over their personal 
information and so to realize Westin’s notion of privacy.4 
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 1. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 40–41 (1967).  
 2. Id. at 42. 
 3. Id. at 7 (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others”). 
 4. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 242 (2013) (identifying the Fair 
Information Practice Principles that have formed the core of privacy law and policy for the past 
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In their illuminating and important article, Professors Joshua 
Fairfield and Christoph Engel explore a problem with this basic 
paradigm: when one person chooses to reveal personal information, 
the act frequently discloses others’ personal data as well.5 Fairfield 
and Engel provide a cogent and useful account of these privacy 
spillovers.6 They then confront head-on the logical implication of such 
externalities: the law cannot provide each individual with control over 
his or her personal information.7 Even if it wants to; even if it tries to; 
even if it perfectly implements Westin’s notion of individual control, 
the law cannot achieve this end for the simple reason that one 
person’s decisions to disclose his or her personal information often 
affect the privacy of others. “Individual control of data is a 
fundamentally flawed concept.”8 
Fairfield and Engel do not despair. Instead, they offer a new 
account of privacy regulation to supplement the traditional model 
grounded in Westin’s ideas. Their approach is based less on notice 
and choice, and more on allowing groups of people to coordinate 
their actions and so achieve the privacy that they all desire.9 Their 
theoretically and empirically well-grounded argument forces us to 
rethink the very project and form of privacy regulation. Fairfield and 
Engel do not dispute the importance of Westin’s formulation of 
traditional, control-based privacy law. But they do create an 
important supplement that fills in a blind spot in contemporary 
privacy law and policy. This is an extremely valuable project and 
Professors Fairfield and Engel carry it off with rigor and elegance. 
Their analysis, however, is itself incomplete. Fairfield and 
Engel’s account of privacy, and of privacy law, focuses almost entirely 
on individuals who disclose information about others. It does not 
directly address the role that corporations play in the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal information. In so doing, it skips over a 
 
four decades); Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: A Pretty Good Privacy Solution 1 (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/TECH-Rubinstein-Big-Data-A-
Pretty-Good-Privacy-Solution.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P5D-XGFA] (noting that Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs) “form the basis of all modern privacy law”). 
 5. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 
385, 389–90 (2015); Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 429 (2011) (“The idea is that disclosure of 
information by some people can reveal information about other people, to their detriment.”). 
 6. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 389–90, 407–08. 
 7. Id. at 408–12. 
 8. Id. at 390. 
 9. Id. at 408–12. 
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significant—perhaps the most significant—part of the problem. This 
is intentional. Fairfield and Engel recognize that “[p]rivate companies 
have accumulated deep and potentially toxic pools of consumer 
data.”10 They make a conscious choice to focus, instead, on 
individuals.11 Still, the gap is an important one. Any set of policy 
prescriptions that would seek to improve privacy in a meaningful way 
must address the business activities that contribute so significantly to 
the problem.12 Fairfield and Engel’s solutions do not deal with this 
important part of the issue. 
This response seeks to fill that gap. Using some of the same 
economic concepts as Fairfield and Engel—specifically, public goods 
and the tragedy of the commons—it develops a complementary 
account of business use of personal information, why society should 
regulate it (and why the companies themselves should want this), and 
how to conceptualize this regulatory project. It offers not so much a 
criticism of Fairfield and Engel’s work, as an addition to it. Their 
theory focuses on individuals and groups of individuals; mine, on 
corporations. Any solution worth its salt will need to cover both. 
Part I of this response introduces more fully Fairfield and 
Engel’s argument about privacy spillovers and their implications for 
privacy law and policy. Part II discusses Fairfield and Engel’s call for 
group coordination strategies that will supplement the traditional 
“notice and choice” regulatory approach. This Part argues that these 
group-coordination strategies will likely succeed only with respect to 
one of the two types of privacy externalities that Fairfield and Engel 
identify. Specifically, it highlights the fact that such interventions do 
not address corporate and government uses of personal information 
and so fail to address the larger part of the privacy problem. Part III 
examines Fairfield and Engel’s claim that, left unaddressed, 
individual privacy externalities will lead to a tragedy of the commons. 
Drawing on the work of Professor Shi-Ling Hsu, this Part argues that 
 
 10. Id. at 392.  
 11. See id. at 421 (“In taking this approach, we focus less on rules restraining large-scale 
bad actors, and more on the dilemma of groups seeking to cooperate in the face of a social 
dilemma.”).  
 12. The government is also a major contributor to the privacy problem, as the National 
Security Agency’s recent actions make clear. This article focuses on the privacy externalities 
that the private sector creates. Parts IV and V of this article analyze the corporate contribution. 
They suggest that it could produce a tragedy of the commons, and that commons-management 
theory provides a useful framework for addressing it. This article does not directly address 
governmental contributions to the privacy problem. It leaves for another day the question of 
how best to reduce government-created privacy injuries. 
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Fairfield and Engel identify a large-group externality, not a true 
tragedy of the commons. This distinction is an important one, as it 
affects the rationale for government intervention. Part IV looks 
further into the tragedy of the commons idea. It argues that the 
information economy is indeed confronting a true tragedy of the 
commons, although not the one that Fairfield and Engel identify. The 
commons is a user trust. Companies dip into and rely on this trust 
each time they ask a user to provide them with personal information 
as part of a digital interaction. They have a short-term incentive to 
abuse this trust for financial gain. But if they over-exploit user trust, 
individuals will significantly reduce the amount of personal 
information that they share, thereby damaging the companies 
themselves. In short, companies that over-exploit the trust commons 
will damage it and so deprive themselves of the very resource—user 
trust—on which they rely. This is a true tragedy of the commons. Part 
V looks to commons-management theory, particularly the work of 
Professor Carol Rose, to generate ideas as to how society might best 
avert this impending tragedy of the trust commons. 
I.  CHALLENGING THE DOMINANT PARADIGM 
Professors Fairfield and Engel make two principal, highly 
convincing points about the nature of privacy. First, building on the 
work of Professor Mark MacCarthy,13 they argue that individual 
decisions to disclose personal information affect the privacy of others 
in two ways.14 One is immediate and direct. For example, an 
individual who posts on social media a photograph of herself standing 
with friends would thereby reveal not only her own whereabouts, but 
also that of others in the picture.15 Similarly, an individual’s decision 
to reveal her location (by carrying a smartphone, for example) can 
reveal the probable location of those intimates with whom she spends 
a lot of time.16 Individuals also create indirect privacy spillovers. Their 
 
 13. See MacCarthy, supra note 5, at 445–68 (discussing negative privacy externalities). 
 14. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 389. 
 15. Id. at 402. The combination of location and social-media information also frequently 
reveals information about others. “Cell phones track individuals’ location precisely, and by 
proxy, the locations of others. Knowledge of where one person is, augmented by knowledge of 
that person’s social network, can help to identify and locate those who are regularly in proximity 
to that person.” Id. at 402–03. In these and other such examples, an individual’s decision to 
disclose particular pieces of information about herself can immediately and directly reveal 
information about others as well.  
 16. Id. at 402. 
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decisions to participate in the digital society—to visit a Web site, 
make an online purchase, carry a smartphone, use a “smart meter” 
for electrical consumption in their home, etc.—leave a data trail that 
contributes to the overall pool of personal information. Analysts can 
use this data to create highly accurate profiles that allow them to 
predict others’ personal information.17 For example, certain women 
made a decision to shop at Target, which revealed their purchasing 
habits to the store. Target then combined these customer-purchase 
records with public listings of live births to construct a profile of the 
pregnant Target shopper. It then applied this profile prospectively to 
its current female customers in order to predict, with great accuracy, 
which were pregnant.18 The decisions of the women in the first group 
to disclose what they had purchased and that they had given birth 
allowed Target to infer latent information about the second group. 
This, too, is a form of privacy externality.19 
Fairfield and Engel’s second main point about the nature of 
privacy is that the good of living in a society that respects privacy is a 
nonexcludable, nonrivalrous, pure public good.20 It is nonexcludable 
in the sense that if it is available to one, it is available to all. It is 
nonrivalrous in that one person’s enjoyment of the good does not 
limit others’ ability to enjoy it. This is an important point because 
markets handle negative externalities that harm public goods much 
less well than those that damage private goods. When an externality 
impacts a private good and transaction costs are low, market 
transactions can typically prevent the occurrence of inefficient 
externalities. That is one of the Coase theorem’s key points.21 For 
example, if A and B are neighbors, and A decides to cut down a tree 
on her property that will rob B of much-valued shade, this damages 
the “shadiness” of B’s property—a private good. If B values the 
shadiness more than A values cutting down the tree, B can pay A to 
keep the tree standing.22 In this way, a market transaction can prevent 
an inefficient externality. 
 
 17. Id. at 389–91. 
 18. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5Y42-
2PXX].   
 19. See id. 
 20. See Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 390.  
 21. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–44 (1960). 
 22. In a world of no transaction costs, such transactions will prevent all inefficient 
externalities regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. See id.; see also PETER S. 
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Market transactions have a much harder time accomplishing this, 
however, where the externality impacts a pure public good. The 
nonexcludability of public goods gives rise to collective-action and 
free-rider problems that greatly increase transaction costs and so can 
prevent deals that would have prevented inefficient externalities. 
Clean air is a good example. If it is provided to one, it is provided to 
all. It is nonexcludable. Polluters (factories, cars, etc.) emit pollutants 
and thus use up the clean air resource. Even if the pollution is 
inefficient (that is, the marginal cost of pollution control is less than 
the marginal cost to health and the environment of continued 
pollution), market transactions will not prevent it.23 It is not in 
anyone’s interest to organize all who must breathe the air and get 
them to contribute. Moreover, each individual can sit back and let the 
others pay for the controls. Those who do so can still breathe the air 
once others have improved it. Together, the collective-action and 
free-rider problems will prevent market transactions from addressing 
many inefficient externalities. 
Fairfield and Engel explain that the good of living in a society 
that protects privacy, much like the good of living in a society with 
clean air, is a public good.24 If one of us gets to live in such a society, 
then we all do. This means that, unlike the neighbor who pays to 
protect the “shadiness” of his property, few will pay to provide the 
good of a privacy-protective society. This confronts each of us with a 
“social dilemma.”25 Each gets the full benefit of sharing personal 
information but externalizes most of the privacy costs onto others. No 
one will pay us to refrain from imposing the externality because 
privacy in society is a public good. From an individual perspective, it 
therefore makes sense to continue sharing the information. But if all 
of us make this decision, as all of us will, this ends up creating a 
privacy-depleted society that few desire to live in.26 Individual 
decisions prevent us from reaching a state that we, as a group, would 
prefer. They lead us to foul our own nest with excessive amounts of 
 
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 57 (1994) (explaining 
that public good problems would “solve themselves . . . if it were costless to bargain”).  
 23. See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 22–23 (4th ed. 2014) (describing the collective-action and free-rider problems in an 
environmental context); see also MENELL & STEWART, supra note 22, at 54–55 (applying these 
concepts in the air pollution context).  
 24. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 423–33. 
 25. Id. at 387, 422, 456. 
 26. Id. at 423. 
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personal information, much as individual decisions to operate a 
factory, drive a car, or run a lawn mower produce the smog that 
makes the air unhealthy for all. 
In Fairfield and Engel’s capable hands, this insight is a powerful 
one, indeed. They use it to explain the so-called “privacy paradox,” in 
which people say in surveys that they do not want to reveal their 
personal information to others, yet in practice they do so all the time. 
Most have chalked this up to a failure in notice and choice. Fairfield 
and Engel show, however, that it is the social dilemma that causes it: 
“In weighing important decisions about privacy, individual and group 
incentives diverge. . . . [I]ndividuals’ fully informed privacy decisions 
tend to reduce overall privacy, even if everyone cherishes privacy 
equally and intensely.”27 This insight into a problem that has bothered 
privacy theorists for years is itself worth the price of admission. 
Fairfield and Engel further use their externality and public-goods 
analysis to identify an important gap in privacy law and policy, and 
offer a way to fill it. As stated above, they explain that notice, choice, 
and purpose limitation are insufficient in a world of privacy 
externalities.28 In a highly original argument they maintain that, in 
order to prevent such externalities, law and policy must provide 
groups with the means to overcome the social dilemma that leads to 
an undesired, privacy-depleted society.29 “[G]roups must be given 
tools to create the public good of privacy and resist the public bad of 
readily available intrusive information . . . . The relevant legal tools, 
therefore, should be redesigned to focus less on individual knowledge 
and empowerment and more on facilitating groups’ collective 
protection of their privacy.”30 Fairfield and Engel draw on the 
neoclassical and behavioral economics literature, particularly the 
experimental evidence on group coordination, to suggest subtle 
interventions that would allow groups more easily to coordinate and 
so to achieve their members’ true preferences.31 These intelligent, 
theoretically- and empirically-grounded suggestions include 
reminding users of social networks that they are repeat players in 
order to induce them to cooperate;32 showing users that they benefit 
 
 27. Id. at 423; see id. at 400. 
 28. Id. at 389.  
 29. See id. at 388–89.  
 30. Id. at 395–96.  
 31. Id. at 396, 433–56.  
 32. Id. at 438–39.  
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from others’ privacy-protective actions, and so leveraging  their 
“inequity aversion” to encourage them to act more responsibly;33 
providing people with evidence that others are protecting their 
privacy, and so tapping into their human desire to reciprocate by 
doing the same;34 increasing the payoff that individuals receive from 
privacy-friendly behavior;35 and other interesting and useful 
techniques.36 These suggestions add valuable arrows to the quiver of 
privacy law and policy. 
II.  WILL GROUP-COORDINATION SOLUTIONS REALLY  
SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
Group-coordination solutions are not sufficient, however. 
Fairfield and Engel focus on the spillovers that individuals create. For 
the most part, they do not address the privacy harms that businesses 
produce even though these, too, constitute negative externalities.37 As 
was mentioned above, they do this intentionally. Fairfield and Engel 
certainly recognize that “[p]rivate companies have accumulated deep 
and potentially toxic pools of consumer data.”38 They choose to focus 
more on groups of individuals trapped in a social dilemma, and less 
on large-scale business contributors.39 Still, it is worth pointing out 
 
 33. Id. at 439, 445–46.  
 34. Id. at 447–48.  
 35. Id. at 441, 443, 449–50. 
 36. Fairfield and Engel summarize them as follows:  
This Article mines the behavioral-economics literature to find new approaches to 
privacy protection that permit groups to sustain cooperation and protect privacy even 
without direct government intervention. We suggest a focus on empowering groups. 
We suggest leveraging inequity aversion, reciprocity, and normativity to lessen 
exploitation among group members. We suggest positive framing to promote 
altruism. We suggest that communication and (private) sanctions are key components 
of group coordination. With these tools, groups may be able to sustain privacy 
without governmental intervention and the challenges and distortions that flow 
therefrom. 
 Id. at 396 (footnotes omitted). 
 37. Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can 
Learn From Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2006). 
 38. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 392.  
 39. See id. at 421 (“In taking this approach, we focus less on rules restraining large-scale 
bad actors, and more on the dilemma of groups seeking to cooperate in the face of a social 
dilemma.”). 
  Fairfield and Engel argue that Congressional gridlock will prevent legislative solutions 
to corporate-privacy violations, and that interventions focused on individuals will be easier to 
achieve. See id. at 419–20. The environmental experience has been the opposite. Laws that seek 
to regulate individuals have proven highly controversial. Congress has found it easier politically 
to regulate corporate contributors and most environmental laws take this approach. It may be 
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that their solutions address the smaller part of the problem. If privacy 
law is to achieve its aims, it must address the business dimension.40 
Fairfield and Engel invoke the environmental analogy,41 and it is apt 
here. Businesses and individuals both contribute to environmental 
degradation.  But the business contribution is larger and so 
environmental law focuses on it. The same is true in privacy. 
Although individuals do impose privacy externalities on one another, 
companies contribute greatly to the problem. Any set of policy 
prescriptions that would seek meaningfully to improve the privacy 
picture must address the corporate contributions.42 
Even with respect to the privacy externalities that individuals 
create, Fairfield and Engel’s group-coordination solutions are likely 
to work better for the first type of privacy externality—the direct 
spillovers—than for the second, the data trails that fuel data analytics. 
Most individuals can intuitively grasp that posting a group photo 
affects the privacy of others. They may even be able to see that 
disclosure of their location data can provide clues as to the 
whereabouts of their intimates. Group-coordination policies that 
work by making individuals more aware that they are repeat players, 
or that privacy-friendly behaviors can produce pay-offs, have a 
chance of working in such situations. 
It is much harder to see how such group-coordination strategies 
could address the second category of spillovers. As Fairfield and 
Engel themselves recognize, most individuals understand neither the 
data stores they are helping to create nor the ways in which data 
analysts can use such information to produce actionable insights.43 No 
one, not even the analysts themselves, can foresee the insights that 
analytics will reveal from a particular data set.44 Given these deep 
informational deficits, how can group-coordination strategies 
premised on repeat play, individual payoffs, inequity aversion, or 
 
that less intrusive, group-coordination methods will prove less controversial than government 
regulation of individuals. But this is due to the regulatory strategy (group-coordination vs. direct 
regulation) and not to the regulatory target (individuals vs. corporations).  
 40. The government is also a major contributor to the privacy problem, as the National 
Security Agency’s recent actions make clear.  
 41. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 419. 
 42. Parts IV and V of this article analyze the corporate contribution.  
 43. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 390. 
 44. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 173 (2013) (explaining that 
“unimagined” secondary uses emerge from personal data, and that this makes it harder to 
protect individual privacy with respect to those data). 
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reciprocity have their intended effect? Such strategies depend on 
individuals having a basic understanding of the data they are releasing 
and how it impacts privacy. With respect to big data and data 
analytics, that understanding is largely missing. When it comes to 
predictive analytics, then, individuals will likely have a much harder 
time employing group-coordination strategies to protect themselves. 
Instead, it may become necessary for the public to confront difficult 
questions about which predictions companies and governments 
should be able to act upon, and which they should not. Should it be 
permissible for a company to predict someone’s risk of suffering from 
a serious mental or physical illness in the future, and then use this as 
the basis for denying that person employment, housing, or a loan? 
Data analytics can make such predictions with accuracy.45 What are 
appropriate, and what are inappropriate, uses of this power? 
These are not questions of group coordination. They are deep 
questions of values that require us to think about the type of society 
we want to have and government’s role in achieving it. Data analytics 
can produce both highly beneficial social and economic outcomes, 
and harmful privacy and discriminatory impacts.46 Society needs a 
mechanism for identifying, and preventing, those data-analytics 
applications for which the harms manifestly outweigh the benefits. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
could use its unfairness authority to make such determinations.47 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC 
to declare “unfair” and unlawful those business activities that 
substantially injure consumers, that consumers cannot protect 
themselves against, and that create more harms than benefits.48 This 
should allow the FTC to examine specific data-analytics applications 
that substantially injure consumers (by, for example, denying them 
credit or a job), weigh the benefits that they produce against the 
harms that they create, and determine, on balance, whether the 
particular application is “unfair.” In this way, the FTC could employ 
 
 45. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014) (explaining that predictions increasingly 
determine “people’s life opportunities—to borrow money, work, travel, obtain housing, get into 
college, and far more”). 
 46. Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, Discrimination and the FTC’s 
Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 346 (2014) (describing a number of these benefits and 
harms). 
 47. Id. at 347, 353–57.  
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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its unfairness authority to sort data-analytics applications that are 
appropriate and fair, from those that are inappropriate and unfair, 
and prevent the latter. This would bolster public support for those 
data-analytics applications in which the benefits outweigh the harms. 
The FTC’s unfairness authority may, or may not, turn out to be the 
best vehicle for making these calls. But society will need to find some 
way of making them if it is to protect itself against data analytics’ 
most harmful impacts and so unlock its tremendous benefits. Fairfield 
and Engel’s group-coordination strategies are unlikely to achieve this. 
III.  TRAGEDIES TRUE, AND LESS TRUE 
Economic theory can provide insight not just into individual 
privacy externalities, but into corporate ones as well. To see this, it is 
necessary to modify Fairfield and Engel’s discussion of the tragedy of 
the commons. 
Fairfield and Engel explain that, just as environmental 
externalities can pollute nonexcludable resources such as clean air or 
clean water, the privacy externalities that individuals impose on one 
another could lead to a tragedy of the commons with respect to the 
public good of privacy.49 “[T]he struggle for privacy is destined to 
become a tragedy.”50  This claim employs a common, though not the 
most precise, usage of the term “tragedy of the commons.” As 
Professor Shi-Ling Hsu has explained, scholars have used the term to 
refer to two distinct phenomena, only one of which is a true tragedy 
of the commons.51 First, scholars use the term to refer to “large-group 
externality problems in which resource users impose externalities 
upon a larger population, without necessarily harming themselves” 
and without reducing others’ ability to exploit the resource.52 For 
example, those who pollute the air externalize most of the costs onto 
the large group composed of individuals who breathe the air. They 
bear only the small fraction of the cost associated with their 
 
 49. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 391.  
 50. Id. They later explain that privacy externalities are more likely to cause a “drama” of 
the commons than a “tragedy” because, as Elinor Ostrom and others have pointed out, some 
communities have found ways to overcome the social dilemma that otherwise would lead to 
tragedy. Id. at 395. This does not alter their claim that the current incentive structure will lead to 
dynamic that Garrett Hardin termed a “tragedy of the commons” with respect to privacy. It just 
refers to the fact that communities need to struggle in order to overcome this dynamic.  
 51. Shi-Ling Hsu, What IS a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign 
Spending Problem, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 75, 78 (2005).  
 52. Id. at 81. 
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membership in this larger group. Moreover, in the absence of a 
regulatory or some other property-rights regime, the factory’s 
emissions do not reduce other polluters’ ability to emit.53 Given that 
each polluter gains the full benefit of its emissions but bears only a 
small fraction of the cost (the same fraction as that borne by each 
other member of the breathing public), individual factory owners or 
other emitters will continue to emit regardless of the costs and the air 
will become polluted. 
Hsu distinguishes these situations from true tragedies of the 
commons in which resource users exploit a nonexcludable resource in 
such a way that they “detract from their own ability to continue to 
exploit the resource.”54 Fisheries provide a clear example of this 
second usage.55 A fishery naturally replenishes itself as the fish 
reproduce. If the fishers harvest the resource in a sustainable way, the 
fishers will have fish to catch well into the future. However, if they 
take too many fish at once, this can cause the fish population to crash 
and thus destroy the fishing ground. When this happens, the fishers 
themselves lose, not just in their capacity as members of the broader 
public, but in their role as resource users who no longer have a 
resource to exploit. 
Resources like a fishery are partially rivalrous.56 They are 
nonrivalrous up to a point. So long as the fishers do not harvest too 
many fish, their exploitation of the resource does not constrain 
others’ ability to use it. But once the exploiters cross a threshold—
once they remove too many fish in too short a time—the resource 
crashes. At that point, the resource becomes rivalrous in 
consumption.57 Other partially rivalrous resources would include 
aquifers that lose their ability to recharge themselves when 
 
 53. Id. at 94. The clean-air resource is therefore both nonexcludable in the sense that all 
can make use of it, and nonrivalrous in the sense that one user’s exploitation of the resource 
(emission of air pollutants) does not reduce another’s ability to emit as well. This makes it a 
pure public good in that it is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. See Brett M. Frischmann, An 
Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 943 
(2005). 
 54. Hsu, supra note 51, at 78.  Professor Jane Yakowitz makes an interesting case for 
treating de-identified personal information used for research purposes as a partially rivalrous, 
nonexcludable resource. See generally Jane Yakowitz, The Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011).  
 55. Id. at 100–05. 
 56. Frischmann, supra note 53, at 951–53. Frischmann refers to such goods as “partially 
(non)rivalrous,” rather than as “partially rivalrous.” Id. at 952. The meaning is the same. 
 57. Id. at 953. 
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communities withdraw too much water too quickly,58 roadways that 
clog up from traffic congestion,59 or Garrett Hardin’s example of the 
common grazing field that cannot regenerate its grass due to 
overgrazing.60 
Resources of this type share three key features. The first is the 
“stock” variable—the core resource that is potentially renewable.61 A 
fishery, aquifer, common grazing field, or roadway each represents a 
type of stock. The second is the “flow” variable—the rate at which 
the good the resource produces is extracted.62 Fish, fresh water, grass, 
and open roadways for transit would each constitute a flow. The third 
is the “fringe” value—the number of resource units (fish, fresh water, 
grass, open road) that can be harvested without impairing the 
resource’s ability to regenerate.63 If appropriators harvest more than 
the fringe, they end up destroying the stock and reducing (or 
eviscerating) the flow. If, on the other hand, they harvest the source 
in a sustainable manner, then the stock can continue to generate the 
fringe indefinitely.64 
In his classic essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett 
Hardin uses the term interchangeably to refer both to large-scale 
externality problems (for example, air pollution) and to true tragedies 
of the commons. However, he focuses on true tragedies involving 
partially rivalrous resources, and not on large-group-externality 
problems involving nonrivalrous resources.65 Hardin’s article centers 
on the cattle herders who graze their animals on a common grazing 
field.66 The grass will renew itself so long as the cattle herders do not 
over-graze it. However, if they add too many cattle to the field, the 
animals will eat the grass down to its nubs so that it no longer 
regenerates.67 This makes the common grazing field a partially 
rivalrous resource. It provides a sustainable yield of grass up to a 
 
 58. Hsu, supra note 51, at 88. 
 59. Id. at 95. 
 60. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 61. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990).   
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See generally Hardin, supra note 60 (focusing on the effects of overpopulation on 
resources such as food and energy itself). 
 66. Id. at 1244. 
 67. Id.  
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point. But if the resource use exceeds that threshold—if the harvest 
exceeds the fringe—the grass resource, much like a fishery, will 
collapse. 
Hardin’s key point is that rational herder will not stop at this 
threshold.68 Since the field is open to all herders, an individual herder 
captures the full benefit of each animal that he adds to the field but 
shares the cost, in terms of the grass consumed, with all the other 
herders. Acting rationally, the herder will add another animal to the 
field, and then another, and another. So will the other herders.69 This 
leads to the destruction of the field. Having harvested more than the 
fringe value, the herders destroy the stock and decimate the flow. As 
a result, they end up destroying the very resource—the grass—on 
which they themselves depend. They hurt themselves, not just as 
members of the general public, but in their capacity as cattle herders. 
They ruin their own livelihood. That is why the result is tragic, and 
not just sub-optimal or harmful. “Ruin is the destination to which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a world that believes 
in freedom of the commons.”70 
Hsu’s distinction between “true traged[ies] of the commons,” 
such as Hardin’s cattle herder example, and “large-scale externality 
problems,” such as air pollution,71 is important when it comes to the 
rationale for government intervention. With respect to large-scale 
externalities it will make economic sense for emitters to install 
pollution controls so long as the marginal cost of control is less than 
marginal cost of the externality imposed on the public.72 This could 
justify a public policy requiring such controls. But a polluter, acting 
rationally, will resist such government intervention.73 Each polluter 
bears only a small fraction of the cost of the pollution—the same as 
that borne by any other member of the public who breathes the air—
but would have to bear the full costs of installing the pollution 
controls. The polluter’s interest will lie in less control, not more. 
Not so for a true tragedy of the commons. Here, in the absence 
of government intervention or some other means of social control, 
the resource users will end up destroying the resource on which they 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Hsu, supra note 51, at 92. 
 72. Id. at 93. 
 73. See id. at 92. 
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themselves rely. This provides an “additional, simple and compelling 
justification [for government intervention]: save the resource users 
from themselves.”74 An enlightened cattle herder, able to think long-
term and foresee the inevitable tragedy, should favor such an 
intervention so long as it constrains all cattle herders and does, in fact, 
avert the tragedy. 
Fairfield and Engel’s privacy spillovers create a large-scale 
externality problem, not a true tragedy of the commons. As they 
describe it, an individual’s release of information about self and 
others contributes to the overall lack of privacy in the culture.75 The 
individual suffers the cost of living in such a culture. This injury is the 
same as that which any other member of the public suffers.76 
Moreover, the individual’s release of information constrains neither 
her own, nor anyone else’s ability to disclose information and use up 
the privacy resource in the future. In this respect, an individual’s 
privacy spillovers are analogous to air pollution. Releases of 
information, like emissions of air pollutant, impose a cost on the 
broader public that the emitter bears only insofar as she is a member 
of that larger group. There is no threshold beyond which the privacy 
resource, or the clean air resource, collapses and prevents future 
appropriation. Privacy, for Fairfield and Engel, is a nonexcludable, 
nonrivalrous public good, much like clean air.77 Individual release of 
information creates a large-group externality, not a true tragedy of 
the commons. 
This matters for two reasons. First, as explained above, large-
group externalities create a weaker rationale for social control than 
do true tragedies of the commons. That may be why Fairfield and 
 
 74. Id. at 94. 
 75. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 423. 
 76. Where A releases B’s personal information (for example posts a group photo in which 
B appears), then A’s action affects B more than it does a member of the general public. B’s 
privacy is a private good, not a public one. However, where A, B, C, D, E, etc. are all posting 
many photos and causing many other privacy spill overs, this affects the state of privacy in 
society. That is the focus of Fairfield and Engel’s analysis. They look at all of the individual acts 
combined and the broader effect that they have on privacy in society. Living in a society that 
provides privacy is a public good. See, e.g., id. at 388–92.  
 77. Id. at 387, 423 (defining “public good” as a “nonrival and nonexcludable resource” and 
arguing that “privacy is a public good as that term is strictly defined in the economics 
literature”). Fairfield and Engel examine the possibility of conceptualizing privacy as an impure 
public good, id. at 442–44, but conclude that the pure public good characterization makes more 
sense “if one considers the broad run of the Internet . . . .” Id. at 444. 
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Engel focus on group-empowerment solutions that entail a “reduced 
need for government intervention.”78 
Second, while it almost always makes sense for the public to take 
action in order to prevent a true tragedy of the commons, the same is 
not necessarily true for large-scale externalities. Take air pollution. 
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to control air 
emissions only so long as the marginal cost of controls is less than the 
marginal social benefit in terms of pollution reduced.79 The same 
would hold true for the individual privacy spillovers on which 
Fairfield and Engel focus. Society may wish to reduce them if this can 
be achieved in a cost-effective way. But if the marginal cost of control 
is greater than the marginal benefit, then controls—even those 
produced by non-interventionist group-coordination solutions—
would not make economic sense. Fairfield and Engel assert that 
society should seek to reduce individuals’ privacy spillovers. 
However, they do not show that the marginal benefit of doing so will 
necessarily be greater than the marginal cost. In this regard, they do 
not demonstrate that the activity is socially harmful or that 
intervention is necessarily warranted.80 
IV.  THE TRAGEDY OF THE TRUST RESOURCE 
The over-use of personal information is leading to a tragedy of 
the commons but it is not the one that Fairfield and Engel identify. 
Instead, it is a tragedy of the trust commons. All economies depend 
on trust.81 “We trust that merchants will accept the small, green pieces 
of paper that we’ve earned in exchange for goods and services. We 
trust that airplanes will arrive safely and to the correct airport. We 
trust that professionals in our service will act in our best 
interest . . . .”82 The information economy is no different. When we 
engage in a digital transaction, visit a Web site, enter a search query, 
 
 78. They offer an approach that entails a “reduced need for government intervention,” id. 
at 398, and that “sustain[s] cooperation with minimal outside intervention.” Id. at 420.  
 79. Distributional and ethical concerns may alter this analysis in particular cases. 
 80. This is not an idle question. Fairfield and Engel’s group-coordination solutions could 
impose significant marginal costs. For example, interventions that reduce the amount of 
information available for data analytics could prevent analysts from making health- or safety-
promoting predictions. 
 81. See generally Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy 
Law, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655719 [http://
perma.cc/PS4D-UN78] (analyzing the role of trust as a positive function of privacy). 
 82. Id. (manuscript at 3–4). 
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or make a purchase from an online store, we trust the provider to 
supply us with goods and services that will not hurt us, just as we do in 
the brick-and-mortar economy.83 
In order to participate in the digital economy, we must also trust 
in another way. The information economy is premised on the sharing 
of personal information; it is “mediated by information relationships” 
to a far greater extent than prior economies.84 Participating in the 
information economy accordingly requires us to trust others with our 
personal information. This particular kind of trust—“digital trust”—
consists of our faith that the providers of digital goods and services 
will use our personal information to benefit—not hurt—us. 
The information economy depends on digital trust.85 If people 
were to become convinced that the search engines, social media sites, 
web sites, and other such providers were using their personal 
information to hurt them, they would share less of it.86 For example, 
in the wake of the massive Target data breach in which hackers 
gained access to an estimated forty million credit card numbers and 
seventy million addresses, phone numbers and other pieces of 
personal information,87 approximately one in three shoppers 
interviewed said that they planned to use cash more frequently.88 
They temporarily lost trust in digital credit card transactions and 
started to move away from them. 
The same thing could happen on a broader scale. If users became 
convinced that sharing their personal information with digital 
providers would hurt them, they would start to withhold this data. For 
example, researchers from MIT and Digital Fourth found that, in the 
wake of the Snowden revelations, Google searches for controversial 
 
 83. See id. (manuscript at 4). 
 84. Id.  
 85. See id. (manuscript at 45). 
 86. Id. (manuscript at 6) (“Without trust, people share less information, bad information, 
or no information at all. They become anxious, bewildered, and suspicious. They lie or self-
censor otherwise beneficial information.”). 
 87. Matt Townsend, Lauren Coleman-Lochner & Lindsey Rupp, Target Is Expected to 
Pursue Its First Outside CEO, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 6, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-06/target-is-expected-to-pursue-its-first-outside-ceo 
[http://perma.cc/SX8G-WYYS].  
 88. Paula Rosenblum, In Wake of Target Data Breach, Cash Becoming King Again, 
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paularosenblum/2014/03/17/in-
wake-of-target-data-breach-cash-becoming-king-again [http://perma.cc/AM9F-3XZJ]. 
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terms decreased.89 This affected not just searches related to terrorism 
or bomb-making, but also searches for terms such as “herpes,” 
“eating disorder” and “erectile dysfunction.”90 A 2016 Pew Research 
Center study, consisting of both a survey and focus groups, concluded 
that Americans’ willingness to share personal information with 
commercial entities was “contingent” on whether the benefits of 
doing so outweighed the privacy and security risks.91 Study 
participants expressed concern about the safety and security of their 
information and anger about the ways in which companies use it.92 
The study showed that their willingness to share such information 
“depends on the circumstances of the offer, their trust in those 
collecting and storing the data,” and their sense of how the company 
will share or use the data after collecting it.93 Overall user trust in the 
digital economy is not only a vital resource; it is also an open-access, 
partially rivalrous one. No one can fence it off. Particular companies 
may enhance, or deplete, overall user trust in society. They may try to 
protect user trust in their particular goods or services. But, in the 
absence of laws or other forms of social control, they cannot prevent 
others from dipping into the well of overall user trust, or from 
diminishing it through abusive behaviors. 
Trust naturally replenishes itself. It is a renewable resource. 
After a time, most Target customers likely went back to using credit 
cards, and most Google users likely returned to submitting 
controversial searches. However, if trust absorbs too many body 
blows, it can crash. The Great Recession of 2008 provides a recent 
example of this in an analogous area. A succession of shocks led 
investors, companies, and banks to lose faith in borrowers and in 
financial markets. They stopped lending and the economy ground to a 
halt. The Great Recession consisted not just of a collapse in stock 
prices; it also involved a collapse of trust. The events of 2008 show 
that the trust resource can reach a point of collapse and that, when it 
does, the economic consequences can be severe. The same could 
 
 89. Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search 
Behavior 4 (Apr. 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://mitsloan.mit.edu /shared/ods/
documents/Tucker_WP_2015_Government.pdf&PubID=14380 [https://perma.cc/BRX8-L9FK].  
 90. Id. at 35. 
 91. LEE RAINIE & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PRIVACY AND INFORMATION 
SHARING 2 (2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2016/01/PI_2016.01.14_Privacy-and-Info-
Sharing_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GL9-7XGQ]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 3. 
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happen with the digital trust on which the information economy 
depends.94 
Digital trust, then, is a type of stock for the information 
economy. Society naturally generates it.95 Each trustworthy digital 
interaction reaffirms and enhances it, and each abuse of our personal 
information erodes it. The trust resource can bear quite a few of these 
abusive acts. As shoppers’ use of their credit cards demonstrates, 
digital providers can consume the “fringe” amount of trust without 
causing a collapse. But if the abuse of trust passes a certain threshold, 
if digital entities consume more than the “fringe,” people will start to 
withhold it in a substantial way. They will refrain from participating in 
the information economy, turn to cash, and submit only innocuous 
search requests. The flow of trust, and the personal information that 
it carries with it, will diminish. Like a fishery, the digital trust resource 
will collapse for a time until careful tending can bring it back. 
The open-access, partially rivalrous digital trust resource is 
subject to the tragedy of the commons. Each company that invests 
insufficiently in data security and experiences a breach, takes 
advantage of user ignorance to scoop up sensitive personal 
information,96 sells user data to criminals,97 or otherwise abuses user 
trust for financial gain captures the full benefit of doing so, but shares 
at least some of the cost, in terms of the digital trust eroded, with all 
other digital providers that depend on that trust to support the flow of 
personal information. As a result, each appropriator of the digital 
trust resource will continue to take greater and greater advantage of 
users’ personal information, notwithstanding the fact that doing so 
erodes the resource as a whole.  
This is what we see. Much like fishers in an open-access fishing 
ground, information-economy companies scoop up more and more of 
 
 94. People may react more strongly to a breach of financial trust where their financial 
assets are at stake than they would to a breach of digital trust where their privacy is at issue. 
However, the difference may be more of degree than of kind. Loss of privacy can lead to 
financial harm where, for example, it results in identity theft.  
 95. Indeed, as a species whose great success is in some respects premised on its ability to 
cooperate, trust, including digital trust, may be in our DNA in addition to being in our culture. 
 96. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (describing cell phone flashlight apps that 
surreptitiously capture user’s personal information contained on the phone). 
 97. One of the major U.S. data brokers, Experian, reportedly sold individuals’ personal 
information to an underground identify theft service called Superget.info that had posed as a 
legitimate private investigator. See Experian Sold Consumer Data to ID Theft Service, KREBS 
ON SECURITY (Oct. 20, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/experian-sold-consumer-data-
to-id-theft-service/ [http://perma.cc/K2TD-XSC9].  
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our personal information for the gain that they might achieve from it. 
Cell phone flashlight apps that quietly capture the user’s location, 
contact list, and even photographs, even though this personal 
information has nothing to do with the flashlight service that the app 
provides, provide a particularly salient example.98 There are many 
such abuses of user trust. This dynamic could lead to overuse of the 
common resource, digital trust, on which many businesses rely. 
Digital providers could consume more than the digital trust fringe and 
cause damage to the trust resource. In the same way that banks and 
financial houses started withholding credit during the Great 
Recession, so too would individuals start withholding their personal 
information. This would be a true tragedy of the commons. Like the 
cattle herders’ common grazing field, or the fishing boats’ fishing 
ground, the providers of digital goods and services would have 
destroyed the very resource—user trust—on which they themselves 
depend. What was individually rational would turn out to be 
collectively ruinous. 
Is this already taking place? No. There are few indications that a 
collapse in digital trust is imminent. Could it happen? Further 
research will be required to assess this in a rigorous way. Initial 
evidence, such as the move to cash after the Target data breach, the 
change in post-Snowden Google searches, and the recent Pew 
Research Center study99 suggest that it could. Indeed Fairfield and 
Engel, writing about the NSA’s access to commercial information, 
describe how “[c]itizens have begun to censor themselves online. 
Surveillance has already chilled discourse. Socially, large pools of 
corporate-gathered data damage the societies that generate them.”100 
A collapse of the digital trust resource may await us. 
Framing the issue in this way has important implications. As 
Professor Shi-Ling Hsu has explained, it strengthens the case for 
public intervention.101 Not only are individuals facing a social dilemma 
that results in a large-group externality problem, but information-
economy businesses are confronting a social dilemma of their own 
that could produce a collapse of the digital trust resource on which 
 
 98. See Robert McMillan, The Hidden Privacy Threat of . . . Flashlight Apps?, WIRED (Oct. 
20, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps [http://perma.cc/63VP-AQH9] 
(discussing cell phone apps that surreptitiously capture such information).  
 99. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.  
 100. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 5, at 433. 
 101. See Hsu, supra note 51, at 93–94. 
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they depend. The case for intervention is stronger when the goal is to 
save the industry from hurting itself. 
Reframing the issue as one of trust, rather than one of privacy, 
also reframes the policy debate in a useful way. As Professors 
Richards and Hartzog have explained, the policy discourse today 
typically views privacy protection as a cost and so pits it against 
economic growth.102 Framing the issue in terms of the preservation of 
trust, rather than the protection of privacy, shows that individuals’ 
interests and those of information-economy businesses are, in fact, 
aligned.103 Individuals want to be able to share their personal 
information without being hurt. They want to be able to trust digital 
providers. Businesses want to preserve the digital trust resource that 
is so important to their long-term success. They should support 
policies that rein in abuses, limit trust consumption to the fringe, and 
ensure the sustainability of the digital trust resource and of the 
information economy as whole. 
V.  STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING THE TRUST COMMONS 
How should society go about preventing the destruction of the 
digital trust resource? What kind of intervention is appropriate? 
What is likely to prove most effective? Notice, choice, and purpose 
limitation—the three pillars of traditional privacy regulation—are 
insufficient.104 The proliferation of digital sensors and intermediaries 
makes it increasingly difficult to provide effective notice of collection. 
The growth of data analytics, in which secondary uses are frequently 
not known in advance, makes it harder to provide advance notice of 
use.105 Without effective notice of collection and use, there can be no 
meaningful consent.106 Data analytics, which is premised on finding 
new secondary uses of personal information, may be incompatible 
 
 102. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 81 (manuscript at 5) (“Privacy is a tax on profits, a 
drain on innovation, a dangerous and naïve assumption, and a burden on the individual to fend 
for herself in the digital thicket.”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. (manuscript at 41).  
 105. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning? 5 (N.Y. Univ. 
Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 357, 2012), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1359&context=nyu_plltwp [http://perma.cc/2PWS-QDLT] (explaining 
that big data causes problems for notice and consent). 
 106. Id. 
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with purpose limitation.107 For each of these reasons, traditional 
privacy regulation will not prevent the tragedy of the trust commons. 
Neither will Fairfield and Engel’s group-coordination strategies. 
Companies, not individuals, confront the social dilemma that 
threatens the trust commons. Thus, while group-coordination 
solutions that focus on individuals may improve the situation to some 
degree, they will not avert the tragedy of the trust commons.108 
There is a body of theory that may prove instructive. In the 
environmental arena, scholars and policymakers have devoted quite a 
bit of thought to how best to preserve the commons. If the trust-
preservation issue is, at bottom, a commons problem, then this body 
of work could prove quite relevant. This brief essay cannot fully 
survey this very interesting and useful literature, but it can initiate the 
discussion. 
Professor Carol Rose’s work is particularly instructive. In her 
classic article, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management 
Strategies for Common Resources, Rose identifies the four principal 
strategies of commons management:109 (1) Do-Nothing, in which there 
is no intervention and the resource remains “an open access 
commons”; (2) Keepout, under which existing resource users can 
continue to exploit the commons, but newcomers are barred from 
doing so; (3) Rightway, in which there is regulation of “the way in 
which the resource is used or taken, effectively prescribing the 
methods by which users may take the resource”; and (4) Property, 
which allocates property rights in the resource and distributes these 
rights among the resource users.110 
 
 107. See generally Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4 (“[This article] seeks to reconcile the 
current technological and business realities with the data minimization and purpose limitation 
principles . . . [which are] antithetical to big data . . . .”). 
 108. Fairfield and Engel’s group coordination strategies might work for groups of 
companies. For example, policy interventions that increased business awareness of the possible 
collapse in digital trust might trigger more privacy-friendly behavior. Self-regulatory industry 
initiatives with respect to privacy suggest that group coordination of this type is possible, even if 
difficult to achieve. This might be another potential application of Fairfield and Engel’s fertile 
ideas. 
 109. See Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for 
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10.  
 110. Id. In constructing this list, Rose builds on the work of economist Stephen Cheung. See 
Stephen Cheung, The Structure of Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. 
& ECON. 49, 64 (1970). Assuming that the resource were a fishery, Do-Nothing would leave it 
unprotected, allowing anyone and everyone to harvest as many fish as they desired. Keepout 
would allow established fishers to continue to use the fishery but bar newcomers. Rightway, 
would regulate the technologies that fishers could use by, for example, allowing pole fishing but 
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Rose explains that the cost of a management strategy is actually 
the sum of three distinct types of costs: (1) Administrative or System 
Costs, which are “the system-wide costs of running a management 
strategy, including organizational and policing costs”; (2) User Costs, 
which refer to resource exploiters’ expenditures on the technologies 
or other controls required to reduce their impact; and (3) Overuse or 
Failure Costs, which encompass “damage caused by resource 
depletion” leading up to and including collapse of the resource.111 
Rose contends that society should examine how each of the four 
principal-management strategies applies to the resource in question 
and then “choose the least-cost management strategy, that is, the one 
with the lowest mix of [costs].”112 
Finally, Rose argues that the outcome of this analysis is likely to 
depend on pressure that users are putting on the resource.113 When 
the resource exploitation is minimal, and the pressure is low, Do-
Nothing is likely to provide the lowest mix of system, user, and failure 
costs.114 As the pressure on the resource begins to grow, the Keepout 
strategy begins to look more attractive.115 It incurs some 
organizational and policing costs but it reduces failure costs. As the 
pressure continues to intensify, Keepout incurs greater policing 
costs.116 Rightway may then provide the best solution. The Rightway 
approach is to “permit the outsiders to enter, but to control the 
means by which [exploiters] can take the resource.”117 Finally, as the 
resource exploitation nears maximum intensity, even Rightway may 
not sufficiently manage failure costs. In such situations, a Property 
regime, “in which we figure out how large a total [take] is acceptable 
and auction off the rights as individualized entitlements,” may offer 
the lowest mix of costs.118 
 
not allowing trawling. The fourth strategy, Property, would set a cap on the overall allowable 
take of fish and then auction harvest rights to the highest bidder. Rose, supra note 109, at 9–10.  
 111. Rose, supra note 109, at 12. 
 112. Id. at 14. 
 113. Id. at 12–13.  
 114. See id. at 17 (stating that, under a Do-Nothing strategy, “[t]here are no administrative 
costs for organization and policing; no user technology is specifically dedicated to control; and 
because no one is trying very hard to get the resource, overuse or depletion costs are still low, if 
they are felt at all”). 
 115. Id. at 18–19. 
 116. Id. at 19.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 21. 
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Without additional research it is hard to identify accurately the 
degree of pressure on the digital trust resource. The evidence to date 
suggests that it is greater than zero. As early as 2000, a study found 
that if consumers felt more comfortable about online privacy they 
would spend up to $6 billion more annually on the Internet.119 In a 
2000 survey, 68 percent of respondents reported that they were “not 
at all comfortable” having their online browsing and shopping habits 
linked to their personal identities.120 As was mentioned above, in a 
2014 poll taken soon after the Target data breach, 32 percent of 
shoppers said that they intended to make more purchases with cash 
rather than cards.121 TRUSTe’s annual Privacy Index shows that the 
percentage of Internet users who trust businesses with their 
information online has fallen from 59 percent in 2012, to 57 percent in 
2013, to 55 percent in 2015.122 The 2016 Pew Research Center study, 
discussed above, found that Americans weighed the provider’s 
trustworthiness in deciding whether to share their personal 
information with it.123 This initial research suggests that there is at 
least some pressure on the digital trust resource. The days of treating 
it as inexhaustible—of the Do-Nothing approach—are over. 
It seems equally clear that we are not yet at maximum pressure. 
The digital economy is functioning reasonably well and does not seem 
to be on the verge of collapse. This suggests that a Property regime is 
not yet required. Even if the pressure were intense, Property may not 
be the lowest-cost option in this situation. The system costs of 
defining and enforcing property rights in “digital trust” would be 
much higher than those required to define and police property rights 
in fish or even in air emissions.124 Although the time for Do-Nothing 
has passed, the time for Property has not yet arrived. 
 
 119. Jonathan W. Palmer, Joseph B. Bailey & Samer Faraj, The Role of Intermediaries in the 
Development of Trust on the WWW: The Use and Prominence of Third-Parties and Privacy 
Statements, 5 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM., no. 3, Mar. 2000, at 1, 5 http://jcmc.indiana.edu/
vol5/issue3/palmer.html [http://perma.cc/GD3J-2HFM]. 
 120. Business Week/Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Mar. 20, 
2000), http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b3673010.htm [http://perma.cc/DB9K-GW3N]. 
 121. Rosenblum, supra note 88.  
 122. TRUSTe Privacy Index: 2015 Consumer Confidence Edition, TRUSTE (2015), https://
www.truste.com/resources/privacy-research/us-consumer-confidence-index-2015 [https://perma.
cc/D4H2-Y72Y] (noting these year-over-year changes under the heading “Consumer Trust”).  
 123. RAINIE & DUGGAN, supra note 91, at 3. 
 124. See Rose, supra note 109, at 21–22 (discussing how system costs can add greatly to the 
cost of a Property approach). 
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The digital trust resource is likely at a point of low-to-medium 
pressure. Under Rose’s typology, this suggests either a Keepout or a 
Rightway strategy. Keepout is problematic in this context. The 
information economy thrives on innovation. A regulatory strategy 
that allowed existing businesses to employ personal information, but 
prevented new ones from doing so, could seriously hamper the start-
ups that provide the sector with so much of its energy and creativity. 
A Keepout strategy might also run afoul of the First Amendment by 
limiting certain companies’ ability to collect and use personal 
information.125 Keepout fits the digital economy far less well than it 
fits a fishery. 
This leaves us with Rightway, a strategy suited to low-to-medium 
pressure that is more compatible with the information economy. 
Rightway “prescrib[es] the methods by which users may take the 
resource.”126 With respect to Rose’s hypothetical fishers, this might 
consist of rules specifying that certain types of fishing methods were 
allowed while others, which could over-use the resource and cause 
the fish population to crash, were not. In the present case, it would 
involve rules as to which methods of collecting and using personal 
information, and so of exploiting user trust, were acceptable, and 
which were not. The rules would seek to prevent those business 
activities (such as cell phone flashlight apps that surreptitiously 
collect contact lists, photos and location information) that could over-
exploit user trust and cause it to crash. A Rightway strategy could 
help to preserve sufficient user trust and make the information 
economy more sustainable in the long term. If the rules applied 
equally, the Rightway approach would not create the barriers to entry 
that the Keepout method is expressly designed to establish. 
The picture is not all rosy with respect to Rightway, however. 
The administrative costs of identifying the right way for each relevant 
sector to collect and use personal information would be high. So 
would the costs to the regulated businesses (the “user costs,” in 
Rose’s terminology). Both sorts of costs would be especially high if 
the system were set up so that the regulators, rather than the 
companies themselves, determined which practice or technology was 
the “right” one for a given industry. The design questions that 
 
 125. Cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (applying heightened judicial 
scrutiny to a restriction on the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records under free-speech 
grounds). 
 126. Rose, supra note 109, at 9. 
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frequently arise with respect to such regulatory systems would rear 
their heads here as well. Should the standards be arrived at through 
government rulemaking, industry self-regulation, or a co-regulatory 
approach that combines the two?127 What form should these rules 
take? Should they consist of design standards that tell firms what 
practices and technologies to use, or performance standards that set 
an enforceable goal but allow the regulated businesses to figure out 
how best to achieve it?128 Do information-based rules that require 
companies to collect and report certain data about their operations,129 
or management-based standards that require companies to adopt 
certain internal-management processes,130 have a role to play? Where 
are prescriptive standards needed, and where would market-based 
approaches be more effective? 
The major policy issues in the privacy area are, in large part, a 
variant of these questions. Policymakers and stakeholders have 
struggled for years over whether industry self-regulation, or direct 
government regulation, would more effectively and efficiently protect 
personal information from abuse.131 The Obama Administration’s 
proposed 2015 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act devotes an entire 
Title to co-regulatory codes of conduct.132 The debate between those 
who defend the notice- and choice-based approach to privacy 
regulation,133 and those who prefer a harm-based approach,134 is in 
 
 127. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-
Regulation, or Co-Regulation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439 (2011) (comparing these three 
regulatory approaches with respect to online privacy).  
 128. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER 
& JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 155 (7th ed. 
2013) (defining these two types of regulatory standards); Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & 
Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003) (discussing the difference between 
these two approaches); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1309 (2015) (describing performance-based approaches to privacy law and other forms of 
consumer law).  
 129. See STEPHEN M. JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 188–235 
(2004) (describing laws that require information collection and disclosure).  
 130. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003) (exploring this 
form of regulation). 
 131. See id. at 451–59 (describing the opposing views). 
 132. THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY 
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/
letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AC6-H8YJ].  
 133. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) (discussing innovative ways to provide notice). 
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many respects a discussion about whether to employ design standards 
or performance standards. Regulations that require firms to give 
specific types of notice in particular ways are a type of design 
requirement. A standard that called upon companies to avoid certain 
types or levels of harm, but left it up to the businesses to figure out 
how to achieve this, would be a performance standard. There are 
other alternatives as well. State legislatures employ an information-
based approach when they pass data security breach notification laws. 
The FTC employs a management-based approach when it requires 
companies that have violated the FTC Act to adopt comprehensive 
privacy-management practices as a condition of settlement. 
Policymakers, advocates and scholars are, in many respects, already 
considering which way to regulate is the “Rightway.” 
This article does not seek to answer this question. Instead, it 
suggests that these discussions represent nascent efforts to manage 
the trust commons so as to preserve better this essential resource. If 
policymakers and stakeholders can identify effective strategies for 
preventing the abuse of user trust—and if they can combine them 
with Fairfield and Engel’s recommendations for reducing the privacy 
externalities that individuals create—we might yet avert the tragedy, 
create the kind of privacy-protective society that many of us want to 
live in, and lay the groundwork for a prosperous and sustainable 
information economy. 
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Ctr. for Info. Policy Leadership, A Risk-Based Approach to Privacy? (Mar. 
20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/ Centre/Centres_Privacy_Risk_Framework_Workshop_I_Initial_Issues_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K9JS-NCDM] (encouraging discussion of a more risk-based approach to 
privacy regulation). 
